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Atlantic States Marine Fisheries
Commission: Getting a Grip On
Slippery Fisheries Management
Coastal fishery resources that migrate, or are widely
distributed,across the jurisdictionalboundaries of two or
more of the Atlantic States ...

are of substantial

commercial and recreational importance and economic
benefit to the Atlantic coastal region and the Nation.'
I. INTRODUCTION

The recent 2004 Ocean Commission Report recommended
that Congress grant the Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission
(GSMFC) and Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission
(GSMFC) the same regulatory authority that Congress granted to
the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC or
Commission) in 1993:
Congress should develop new statutory authority, similar
to
the
Atlantic Coastal
Fisheries
Cooperative
Management Act, to support and empower the Gulf
States and Pacific States Fisheries Management
Commissions. All interstate management plans should
adhere to the national standards in the MagnusonStevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act and
the federal guidelines implementing these standards.
States should participate in the development of the
guidelines to ensure they are applicable to interstate

1. Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §
5101(a)(1) (2000). Nationwide, estimates indicate that "recreational fishing
supported nearly 350,000 jobs and generated $30.5 billion for the economy."
NOAA: Anglers Releasing Fish, Supporting Jobs, 66(1) SALT WATER
SPORTSMAN, Jan. 2005, at 34.
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plans.

2

The ASMFC received full regulatory authority in 1993 and
continues to successfully reverse declines of economically and
ecologically valuable fish species in state jurisdictional waters
along the Atlantic Coast. Beginning with regulatory authority
over striped bass in 1984,3 the ASMFC became responsible for the
management of numerous other fish species such as bluefish,
weakfish, summer flounder, black sea bass, scup, and tautog in
1993. As this Comment will demonstrate, the ASMFC, with
regulatory authority, effectively continues to restore many
important coastal fish stocks to sustainable levels through a
conservative scientific approach to fisheries utilization. Similar
results could be achieved for Gulf Coast and Pacific Coast fish
species should Congress grant regulatory authority to the GSMFC
and PSMFC as recommended by the U.S. Commission on Ocean
Policy. However, before Congress grants similar regulatory
authority to the GSMFC and PSMFC, a closer examination of the
ASMFC's authority is necessary to correct apparent flaws in its
4
internal decision-making structure and processes.
Part II of this Comment presents an overview of the national
fisheries management structure, providing the context in which
the ASMFC's role fits. Part III demonstrates that the ASMFC,
with regulatory authority over member states, successfully
manages coastal fisheries resources while the GSMFC and
PSMFC, without regulatory authority, are unsuccessful. Part IV
enumerates important ASMFC procedural and substantive rules,
identifies flaws in the decision-making processes of the
Commission, and uses a recent New Jersey appeal as a case study

2. An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century: Final Report of the U.S.
Commission on Ocean Policy - Pre-Publication Copy 241 (2004),

http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/prepub-report/pre-pub-fin-repo
rt.pdf [hereinafter Ocean Commission Report]. The Commission's Report

represents only the second set of such recommendations for a national ocean
policy in the nation's history.
3. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
4. One main concern is that political persuasion will skew the actions
and decisions of commissioners regarding fishery-management measures,
especially allocation issues, away from the proper basis for fisherymanagement decisions: sound science.
See MANAGING OUR NATION'S
FISHERIES: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 153-54 (David Witherell ed., 2004)
[hereinafter MANAGING OUR NATION'S FISHERIES].
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to demonstrate the shortcomings of fishery management
regulation development within the Commission. Part V urges
Congress to grant regulatory authority to the GSMFC and
PSMFC, but only after recognizing and addressing the problems
apparent within the ASMFC. Part VI concludes that successful
ASMFC management is not devoid of dangerous non-science
influences, which must be checked by a respected appeals process
within the Commission.
II.

OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

Congress passed the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Act (Magnuson Act) in 1976 to address the
alarming decline in many coastal fishery resources precipitated by
decades of unregulated commercial and recreational fishing. 5 The
Magnuson Act governs fisheries in federal waters, or the
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).6 In addition, the Magnuson Act
created eight Regional Fisheries Management Councils to
incorporate the viewpoints of many stakeholders, including
commercial and recreational fishermen, as well as environmental
and consumer groups, into regional fishery decision-making.7 The
Regional Fisheries Management Councils work to represent the
interests of their respective coastal regions and create Fishery
Management Plans (FMPs) for each federally-managed fish
species existing within a regional Council's jurisdiction8 FMPs
must comply with the ten national standards for fishery
conservation and management as set forth in the Magnuson Act. 9
5. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1) (2000) ("It is therefore declared to be the purposes of the
Congress in this chapter - (1) to take immediate action to conserve and
manage the fishery resources found off the coasts of the United States ... .
6. Id. § 1801(b)(1)(A).
7. Id. § 1801(b)(5) (noting the function of the Regional Fishery
Management Councils is to involve participation by State and regional
"fishing industry, consumer and environmental organizations, and other
interested persons" in fishery management, including assessments of the
"social and economic needs of the States").
8. Sharon R. Siegel, Note, Applying the Habitat Conservation Model to
Fisheries Management: A Proposal for a Modified Fisheries Planning
Requirement, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 141, 146 (2000).

9. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a). The Magnuson Act proscribes 10 standards for
fishery conservation and management:
(1) Conservation and management measures shall prevent

234 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol.11:231
Although the national fisheries management structure under the
Magnuson Act draws some criticism, many managers claim that,
under the Magnuson Act, overfishing has been drastically slowed
or reversed due to Council management. 10

overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum
yield from each fishery for the United States fishing industry.
(2) Conservation and management measures shall be based upon the
best scientific information available.
(3) To the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish shall be
managed as a unit throughout its range, and interrelated stocks of
fish shall be managed as a unit or in close coordination.
(4) Conservation and management measures shall not discriminate
between residents of different States. If it becomes necessary to
allocate or assign fishing privileges among various United States
fishermen, such allocation shall be (A) fair and equitable to all such
fishermen; (B) reasonably calculated to promote conservation; and
(C) carried out in such manner that no particular individual,
corporation, or other entity acquires an excessive share of such
privileges.
(5) Conservation and management measures shall, where
practicable, consider efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources;
except that no such measure shall have economic allocation as its
sole purpose.
(6) Conservation and management measures shall take into account
and allow for variations among, and contingencies in, fisheries,
fishery resources, and catches.
(7) Conservation and management measures shall, where
practicable, minimize costs and avoid unnecessary duplication.
(8) Conservation and management measures shall, consistent with
the conservation requirements of this chapter (including the
prevention of overfishing and rebuilding of overfished stocks), take
into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing
communities in order to (A) provide for the sustained participation of
such communities, and (B) to the extent practicable, minimize
adverse economic impacts on such communities.
(9) Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent
practicable, (A) minimize bycatch and (B) to the extent bycatch
cannot be avoided, minimize the mortality of such bycatch.
(10) Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent
practicable, promote the safety of human life at sea.
Id.
10.

MANAGING OUR NATION'S FISHERIES,

supra note 4, at 152-53.
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The Magnuson Act reserved fishery regulation within state
jurisdictional waters to the respective states."
State waters
normally include rivers, estuaries, and coastal waters from the
shoreline to three miles seaward, or the EEZ's shoreward
boundary.
Florida and Texas are exceptions, where state
jurisdiction extends from the coast to nine miles seaward into the
Gulf of Mexico, shoreward of the EEZ. 12 States are free to
implement various regulatory and enforcement practices to
manage fisheries in state waters, including statutes, conservation
and management regulations, and judicial decisions.' 3 Depending
on the state, these devices may be used to tighten or relax
conservation requirements or enforcement measures with regard
14
to fish species within state waters.
Migratory fish, however, do not recognize the boundaries
between state jurisdictional waters, and frequently move between
waters belonging to several different states. Obviously, with such
movement, fishery resources can be exposed to several different
fishery regulation schemes, varying by state. 15 The result of
varying harvests on "mature or spawning stocks in one
jurisdiction [is] reduce[d] recruitment 6 and long term abundance
in neighboring jurisdictions." 7 Excessive harvest of fish stocks in
one or several jurisdictions could deprive more conservative,
neighboring jurisdictions of their access to the coastal fishery
resource.' 8
Without cooperative management, hypothetical
fishermen in state A may be permitted by law to take ten (10) fish

11. See 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a)(1), (a)(2)(A); New York v. Evans, 162 F. Supp.
2d 161, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
12. John Alton Duff & William C. Harrison, The Law, Policy, and Politics
of Gillnet Restrictions in State Waters of the Gulf of Mexico, 9 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 389, 393 (1997) [hereinafter Duff & Harrison].
13. Sarah Bittleman, Toward More Cooperative Fisheries Management:
Updating State and FederalJurisdictionalIssues, 9 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 349, 359
(1996).
14. See id.
15. See RICHARD K. WALL 'CE & KRISTEN M. FLETCHER, UNDERSTANDING
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 26 (2d ed. n.d.)
16. "Recruitment" is the ability of a fish stock to reproduce and protect
young fish until they reach maturity. See id. at 43.
17.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF THE ATLANTIC

STATES MARINE

FISHERIES

COMMISSION, INTERSTATE FISHERIES OF THE ATLANTIC COAST 5 (Paul E. Hamer
et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter INTERSTATE FISHERIES OF THE ATLANTIC COAST].

18.

Id.
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per day of a specific fish species, while fishermen in state B are
permitted to take twenty (20) fish per day of the same species.
Such regulatory inconsistency completely undermines state A's
conservation efforts by allowing fishermen in state B to remove
the very fish that state A seeks to preserve, and removes any
incentive for state A to remain more conservative in its
regulations. 19 Unfortunately, this fragmented regulatory scheme
currently exists among states bordering both the Gulf of Mexico
and the Pacific Ocean. The states bordering the Atlantic Ocean
are the only coastal states acting under an enforceable cooperative
management scheme.
A. Congress created the three regionalCommissions to work within
the nationalstructure
Congress created the three Commissions, the ASMFC, 2o the
GSMFC,21 and the PSMFC22 prior to 1950. The Commissions were
created to promote "the better utilization" of coastal Atlantic,
coastal Pacific, and Gulf of Mexico fisheries. The Commissions
provided a means for joint fisheries management development by
member states for the "promotion and protection" and "prevention
of the physical waste" of interjurisdictional fisheries residing in
the waters of a Commissions' member states. 23
The Commissions' original purpose was to provide coastal
states an opportunity to act cooperatively in developing fishery
regulations for migratory stocks. 24 States consenting to their
regional Commission Compact were to use their coastal
Commission as a vehicle for joint management of important
19. See 16 U.S.C. § 5101(a)(5).
20. Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission Compact, Pub. L. No.
77-539, 56 Stat. 267 (1942) [hereinafter ASMFC Compact], available at
http://www.asmfc.org/publications/revisedCompactRules&Regs03O4.pdf.
21. Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission Compact, Pub. L. No. 8166, 63 Stat. 70 (1949) [hereinafter GSMFC Compact], available at
http://www.gsmfc.org/compact.html.
22. Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission Compact, Pub. L. No. 80232, 61 Stat. 419 (1947) [hereinafter PSMFC Compact], available at
http://www.psmfc.org/ (follow "Publications & Maps" hyperlink; then follow
"PSMFC Compact" hyperlink).
23. GSMFC Compact, 63 Stat. at 70 (art. I); PSMFC Compact, 61 Stat. at
419-20 (art. I); ASMFC Compact, 56 Stat. at 267 (art. I).
24. Elizabeth C. Scott, Note, Managing the Maine Lobster Fishery: An
Evaluation of Alternatives, 20 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 573, 583-84 (2001).
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coastal fisheries with other member states rather than continuing
to promulgate regulations state by state. 25 Thus, Congress
designed the Commissions to serve as sounding boards capable of
representing the various fishery interests and to protect the
26
common good with regard to fisheries.
Each Commission operates an Interstate Fisheries
Management Program (Program) to "promote the conservation
of . .fishery resources ...based on the best scientific information
available, and provide adequate opportunity for public
participation."27 Through the Program, the Commissions carry
out their primary function of making joint fishery regulation
recommendations to the member states through detailed FMPs,
outlining the optimal regulatory approach for each individually
managed fish species. Theoretically, if every state implemented its
Commission's recommended FMP for each species, the coastal
stock would be managed as one ecologically related group of
populations. To achieve this goal, and in an effort to "promote the
conservation" of fishery resources, 28 the Commissions perform
fact-finding and deliberation incorporating both the best scientific
information available as well as regional public comment to arrive
29
at the most appropriate regulatory measures for each species.
The sum of a Commission's FMPs, one for each species, would
represent a comprehensive management structure for all coastal
fisheries governed by the individual commissions, comprising the
best management scheme for targeted species because species
would be managed as a coastal interjurisdictional resource rather
than a resource belonging to individual states.

25. Id. at 583-84; see, e.g., ASMFC Compact, 56 Stat. at 267 (art. II)
("This agreement shall become operative ...as to those states executing it
whenever any two or more of the [coastal states] have executed it....."); id.
at 269 (Art. XII) ("This compact shall continue in force and remain binding
upon each compacting state until renounced by it.").
26. Scott, supra note 24, at 583-84.
27. See, e.g., ATLANTIC STATES MARINE FISHERIES COMMISSION,
INTERSTATE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PROGRAM CHARTER, § 1(b)-(c)(2002),
available
at
http://www.asmfc.org/publications/isfmpCharter03.pdf
[hereinafter ASMFC Charter].
28. See, e.g., ASMFC Charter, supra note 27, § 4(g).
29. Scott, supra note 24, at 584.
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Although the Commissions' jurisdiction for fishery regulation
is mainly constrained to fisheries existing within state waters, the
Commissions work jointly with the Regional Councils established
by the Magnuson Act to establish similar FMPs for fisheries
existing abundantly in both state waters and the federal exclusive
economic zone (EEZ). For example, Congress directs the ASMFC
to consult with the appropriate Regional Councils 30 to develop
FMPs complementary to those developed by the Council(s)
regulating the same species in nearby federal waters. 31 Congress
even directs the ASMFC to create a joint FMP to be implemented
in both state waters and nearby federal waters for a species in the
absence of an equivalent FMP by the appropriate Regional
Council. Because it will reach into federal waters, such an FMP
must comply with the ten national standards set forth in the
32
Magnuson Act.

B. All three commissions only served advisory roles until 1993
Congress designed the three Commissions to serve only
advisory roles in the management of fishery resources in state
waters, and to be powerless to compel member states to adopt the
recommendations formed by the Commission as the preferred
33
fishery management regulations for individual fish species.
Essentially, even after Congress created the three regional
Commissions, member states were no more obligated to
cooperatively manage migratory fish stocks as they were prior to
the creation of the Commissions. The same remains true today for
GSMFC member states and PSMFC member states. The ASMFC
member states, 34 however, are required to follow regulatory

30. Examples of two Regional Councils under the Magnuson Act with
which the ASMFC cooperates are 1) the New England Fishery Management
Council (NEFMC) and 2) the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council
(MAFMC). The Magnuson Act requires these Councils to develop FMPs for
federal waters or economic exclusive zone (EEZ).
31. 16 U.S.C. § 5104(a)(1).
32. Id. § 5103(b)(1)(B); see supra text accompanying note 9 for a list of the
ten FMP standards set forth in the Magnuson Act.
33. Scott, supra note 24, at 584.
34. The ASMFC member states are: Maine, New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. ASFMC Charter, supra note 27, § 8(11).
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recommendations developed by the Commission.
C. Congress granted the ASMFC complete regulatoryauthority in
1993
Between 1950 and 1984, the ASMFC served only an advisory
role in fisheries regulation development to its member states. In
1984, in response to the Atlantic striped bass crisis, 35 Congress
passed the Atlantic Striped Bass Conservation Act, 36 giving the

ASMFC regulatory authority only over the coastal management of
striped bass. Then, in 1993, Congress made a finding that the
then-existing scheme of state-by-state regulation of other species
was inadequate to address the migratory nature of fishery
resources along the Atlantic coast:
[b]ecause no single governmental entity has exclusive
management authority for Atlantic coastal fishery
resources, harvesting of such resources is frequently
subject to disparate, inconsistent, and intermittent State
and Federal regulation that has been detrimental to the
conservation and sustainable use of such resources and to
37
the interests of fishermen and the Nation as a whole.
Based on this finding, Congress passed the Atlantic Coastal
Fisheries Cooperative Fisheries Management Act, 38 delegating

regulatory authority to the ASMFC over all important migratory
fish stocks

of the Atlantic coast

39

and requiring

that the

Commission design fishery management plans (FMPs) for those
important migratory species to be followed by the states. 40 Each
35. See discussion infra Part III.A.1. In the early 1980s, Atlantic striped
bass were feared by many to be on a course for extinction by the beginning of
the 21'" century.
36. 16 U.S.C. § 5151.
37. 16 U.S.C. § 5101(a)(3).
38. 16 U.S.C. §§ 5101 - 5108.
39. Species currently regulated by the ASMFC are: American Eel,
American Lobster, Atlantic Croaker, Atlantic Herring, Atlantic Menhaden,
Atlantic Sturgeon, Black Sea Bass, Bluefish, Horseshoe Crab, Northern
Shrimp, Red Drum, Scup, Shad and River Herring, Spanish Mackerel, Spiny
Dogfish and Coastal Sharks, Spot, Spotted Seatrout, Striped Bass, Summer
Flounder, Tautog, Weakfish, and Winter Flounder. Atlantic States Marine
Fisheries Commission, Managed Species, http://www.asmfc.org/ (follow
"Managed Species" hyperlink).
40. 16 U.S.C. § 5104(a)(1).
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FMP must include a list of all states required to comply with the
plan, and every listed state must adopt, implement, and enforce
the measures delineated in the FMP.41 In other words, the
ASMFC must develop FMPs for each migratory fish species in
need of cooperative regulation, and member states are obligated to
implement the regulations contained in the FMPs developed by
the ASMFC for each species.
The Secretary of Commerce enforces FMPs developed by the
ASMFC. The ASMFC monitors state compliance with FMPs for
each species.
States achieve compliance individually by
implementing into state law the regulations recommended by the
ASMFC for each managed species. 42 If the ASMFC finds that a
state is not in compliance with the current FMPs for a particular
species, the ASMFC reports to the Secretary of Commerce who, in
turn, may impose a moratorium on fishing for the species in
question in the waters of the non-compliant state.43 Thus, if the
ASMFC found a member state in non-compliance with the FMP or
summer flounder, for example, the Secretary of Commerce could
impose the federally-enforced moratorium on all targeted fishing
of summer flounder, causing stress on local fisheries-dependent
economies and angering commercial and recreational fishermen.
Therefore, the moratorium threat deters member states from
choosing not to comply with ASMFC fishery management plans,
and allows the ASMFC to regulate migratory fishery resources
more effectively than it would without such regulatory authority
over the states.

41. Id. § 5104(b).
42. States employ varying methods of promulgating fishery regulations.
Some states, like New Jersey, require an act of the state legislature to change
existing fishery regulations for striped bass, but allows the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection to make changes to fishery
regulations for other New Jersey species in the New Jersey Administrative
Code without an act of the state legislature. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:544-45.1 (West 1997 & Supp. 2005).
43. 16 U.S.C. § 5106(c)(1).
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III. THE REGULATORY ROLE OF THE ASMFC, UNLIKE THE ADVISORY
ROLES OF THE GSMFC AND PSMFC, PROVIDES EFFECTIVE COASTWIDE FISHERY MANAGEMENT

A. Demise of critical species has been stopped or reversed by the
ASMFC
The ASMFC currently manages more than twenty fish and
44
shark species of varying ecological and economic importance.
The ASMFC gained regulatory authority over Atlantic striped
bass in 1984 and regulatory authority over summer flounder in
1993, both very important species economically and ecologically
for the Atlantic seaboard. Regulatory authority enabled the
ASMFC to slow drastic declines of both striped bass and summer
flounder stocks, and to restore both species to historic levels.
1. Atlantic striped bass fully recovered under ASMFC management
Atlantic striped bass are an important migratory coastal
commercial and recreational fishery resource 45 that utilize the
nursery and brackish areas of rivers and estuaries to spawn in
late spring and early summer. 46 Chesapeake Bay, Delaware Bay,
Hudson River, and Roanoke River/Albemarle Sound are the four
major estuarine systems that contribute juvenile striped bass to
the coast-wide stock. 47 Striped bass provided an important fishery
resource until the mid-1970s when annual landings 48 began to
decrease dramatically. Estimates in 1985 indicated that the
striped bass coastal stock plummeted to only 600,000 individual

44. See supra text accompanying note 39.
45. John P. Almeida, Note, Nonpoint Source Pollution and Chesapeake
Bay Pfiesteria Blooms: The Chickens Come Home to Roost, 32 GA. L. REV.
1195, 1215 (1998).
46. See INTERSTATE FISHERIES OF THE ATLANTIC COAST, supra note 17, at
77.
47. Id.; FISHERIES MANAGEMENT REPORT No. 24 OF THE ATLANTIC STATES
MARINE FISHERIES COMMISSION: AMENDMENT 5 TO THE INTERSTATE FISHERY
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR ATLANTIC STRIPED BASS § 3 (March 1995) [hereinafter

Striped Bass Amendment 5](stating that the Hudson River, Delaware Bay,
Chesapeake Bay, and Albemarle Sound were producer areas).
48. "Landings" are "fish taken from the water and placed on shore;
harvest." INTERSTATE FISHERIES OF THE ATLANTIC COAST, supra note 17, at
126.
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49
fish swimming the Atlantic coast.
In 1981, the ASMFC responded conservatively to the sharp
decline in striped bass abundance by recommending size limits,
bag limits, and spawning area closures to reduce fishing
mortality. 50 However, states were not required to adhere to the
recommendations, restricting the effectiveness of the ASMFC
management plan. The Atlantic Striped Bass Conservation Act 5 '
of 1984 cured these implementation and enforcement problems by
giving the ASMFC its first regulatory powers over striped bass. 52
Through the Atlantic Striped Bass Conservation Act, Congress
recognized the importance of cooperative management for the
striped bass stock. 53 The Atlantic Striped Bass Conservation Act
gave the ASMFC the authority to determine whether coastal
states had adopted necessary regulations to restore striped bass
populations and whether
states were enforcing those
regulations. 54 Congress authorized the Secretary of Commerce to
enforce ASMFC findings of state noncompliance with the coastal
FMP for striped bass by means of a fishing moratorium on striped
bass.5 5 Thus, the threat of a moratorium encouraged states to
comply with ASMFC regulations, where a finding of noncompliance and resulting moratorium would cause millions of
dollars of lost business at tackle stores, marinas, and seafood
markets.

49. See FISHERY MANAGEMENT REPORT No. 41 OF THE ATLANTIC STATES
MARINE FISHERIES COMMISSION: AMENDMENT 6 TO THE INTERSTATE FISHERY
(Feb. 2003), available at
http://www.asmfc.orgt (follow "Managed Species" hyperlink; then follow
'Striped Bass" hyperlink; then follow "Amendment 6 to the Interstate
Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass (February 2003)"
hyperlink) [hereinafter Striped Bass Amendment 61.
50. INTERSTATE FISHERIES OF THE ATLANTIc COAST, supra note 17, at 79.
Minimum size limits prevent fishermen from taking fish smaller than a
scientifically-determined critical size that allows for reproduction. Bag limits
prevent fishermen from removing more individual fish than that scientifically
determined to be a safe level of harvest for the re-growth of the stock.
Spawning area closures are timed to allow spawning fish to carry out
reproductive activities with minimal disturbance.
51. Atlantic Striped Bass Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 5151-58. (2000).
52. INTERSTATE FISHERIES OF THE ATLANTIC COAST, supra note 17, at 79.
53. 16 U.S.C. § 5151(b) (the purpose of Congress is "to support and
encourage.. .effective interstate action regarding the conservation and
management of the Atlantic striped bass").
54. Id. § 5153(a)(1), (2).
55. Id. § 5154(a).
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR ATLANTIC STRIPED BASS 1
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Following passage of the Atlantic Striped Bass Conservation
Act in 1984, the Atlantic striped bass populations fully recovered,
and fishermen now report record numbers of striped bass. 56 The
total coastal striped bass population increased from 600,000 fish
in 1984 to 45.6 million fish in 2001, while fishing mortality
remains below the ASMFC target. 57 Congress' decision to mobilize
an enforceable cooperative interstate management effort through
the ASMFC played a significant role in the unprecedented
58
reversal of the disastrous decline in striped bass abundance.
2. ASMFC successfully manages summer flounder
The summer flounder fishery, which reached historic lows in
the early 1990s, provides another example of the effectiveness of
the ASMFC's regulatory role.
In 1990, coastal commercial
landings declined to 9.3 million pounds, while coastal recreational
landings reached a low in 1989 of 3.2 million pounds. 59 The
ASMFC (managing flounder in state waters) in cooperation with
the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council (managing
flounder in the federal EEZ) imposed annual commercial and
recreational coastal quotas translating into minimum size limits
and bag limits on harvested flounder, and data-collection and
record-keeping requirements on dealers and processors of summer
flounder. 60
The Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative
Management Act required ASMFC member states to begin
implementing and enforcing the Commission's summer flounder
regulations in 1993, and states continue to implement various
amendments and addendums to the summer flounder FMP.
Evidence shows that summer flounder stocks are recovering under
ASMFC management: since 2001, coastal commercial summer
flounder landings have topped 13.8 million pounds each year, and

56. Almeida, supra note 45, at 1215.
57. Striped Bass Amendment 6, supra note 49, § 1.2.2.
58. Almeida, supra note 45, at 1215-16.
59. TONI KERNS, 2004 REVIEW OF THE ATLANTIC STATES

MARINE FISHERIES
COMMISSION FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR SUMMER FLOUNDER § III (2004),

available
at
http://www.asmfc.org/speciesdocuments/sfscupbsb/
summerflounder/annualreports/fmpreviews/04fmpreview.pdf.
60. Id. § VI. Minimum size limits set a minimum length for landed fish,
and bag limits restrict the total number of fish that can be taken by each
individual per day.
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recreational landings reached 11.6 million pounds in 2003.61
B. GSMFC and PSMFC do not effectively manage coastal fisheries
without regulatory authority
Unlike the ASMFC with regulatory authority, the GSMFC
and PSMFC cannot successfully design FMPs which are then
implemented and enforced by their member states, preventing
meaningful impact by those Commissions on their respective
region's coastal fisheries. For example, the lack of regulatory
authority prevents the PSMFC from taking control of the spiny
dogfish problem in the Pacific Northwest, and prevents the
GSMFC from uniting the over-reactive response to public outcry
in the Gulf states over gill-net fishing.
1. Spiny dogfish are actively managed by the ASMFC, while
PSMFC is powerless to compel management by Pacific states
Spiny dogfish are small sharks valuable for their meat, fins,
liver, cartilage, and hides, and were at one time widely abundant
in the North Atlantic and North Pacific Oceans along the coast of
the United States. 62 However, similar to many other commercially
desirable fish species, the use of trawls, gillnets, line gear, and
recreational harvest decimated many populations of spiny dogfish
causing near total collapse in most populations. 63 Northwest
Atlantic spiny dogfish stocks are considered overfished, and
Northeast Pacific stocks are severely depleted; significant
Northeast Pacific stock data lacks because the PSMFC and Pacific
states fail to focus on the species.64
In 2000, the ASMFC took emergency action along the Atlantic
coast to close state waters to commercial spiny dogfish harvest
when the state's individual management measures were
inadequate. 65 This action allowed the ASMFC time to develop an
61. Id. § III.
62. Sonja Fordham & Coby Dolan, A Case Study in InternationalShark
Conservation: The Convention on International Trade in EndangeredSpecies

and the Spiny Dogfish, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 531, 551-53, 555 (2004).
63. Id. at 553.
64. See id. at 557-58, 560, 563.
65. MEGAN GAMBLE, TINA MOORE
ATLANTIC

STATES MARINE

FISHERIES

& GREG SKOMAL,
COMMISSION'S

REVIEW OF THE

INTERSTATE

FISHERIES

2003-2004 FISHING YEAR, § I (2004),
available at http://www.asmfc.org/speciesdocuments/dogfish/annualreports/
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR SPINY DOGFISH,
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FMP to slow the decline of spiny dogfish, and the Commission
planned to further tighten spiny dogfish regulations based on the
results of recent data gathered in late 2004.66 ASMFC efforts to
conserve spiny dogfish in state waters led to a determination in
2004 that, although the species was considered overfished,
"overfishing" was no longer occurring, and mortality rates along
the Atlantic coast were reduced enough to allow the population to
grow.

67

Meanwhile, in contrast to populations in the Atlantic, the
Pacific states (with the exception of Washington's efforts to close
spiny dogfish fishing during the time of spiny dogfish "pupping,"
or reproduction periods in the Puget Sound) show little evidence of
managing spiny dogfish. 68 Unquestionably, the presence of an
enforceable cooperative management scheme on the Pacific Coast
would benefit the spiny dogfish population by providing a
mechanism for biologists to identify the necessary regulatory
measures for spiny dogfish recovery, and compelling PSMFC
member states to implement the appropriate FMP developed by
the PSMFC. A PSMFC with regulatory authority would remedy
the failure of the individual Pacific states to address the
unglamorous spiny dogfish as an important component to the
coastal ecosystem just as the ASMFC compelled state action on
the spiny dogfish on the Atlantic coast.
2. A powerless GSMFC was unable to unify Gulf states' reactions to
public outcry demandinggillnet bans in Gulf waters
Commercial gillnet fishing in the Gulf of Mexico is primarily
governed by state law because most commercial gillnet fishing
occurs within state waters, as opposed to federal waters farther
offshore. 69
In the early 1990s, conservationists in Florida
fmpreviews/spinydogfish03-04fmpreview.pdf [hereinafter ASMFC Spiny
Dogfish FMP].
66. Id. § I; see Fordham & Dolan, supra note 62, at 560.
67. ASMFC Spiny Dogfish FMP, supra note 65, § IV.
68. Fordham & Dolan, supra note 62, at 563.
69. Duff & Harrison, supra note 12, at 393. Keep in mind that Florida
and Texas state waters in the Gulf of Mexico extend to nine miles seaward
into the Gulf (most state waters only extend to three miles seaward), where
federal jurisdiction begins. Thus, Florida and Texas have greater impact on
coastal fisheries in the Gulf than do other Gulf states because state waters
include many more square ocean miles than other coastal states. See id.
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petitioned for, and eventually gained, a ban on commercial gillnet
fishing in Florida's waters to preserve fish species such as red
drum and seatrout.70 Recreational fishermen and conservationists
pushed for Florida to follow Texas' lead in banning commercial
gillnetting of desirable fish species, and the public outcry gained
momentum and political support. 71
The perception that
commercial gillnet fishing would increase in states with more
relaxed gillnet regulations as gillnet fishermen were forced out of
more heavily regulated states caused inconsistent gillnet
restrictions among the Gulf states. 72
Florida ignored the GSMFC's admonition that commercial
gillnets were not scientifically shown to be destructive enough to
warrant a gillnet ban in Florida waters. In this situation, public
outcry may have overwhelmed sound science as the basis for the
fishery management decision. Commercial fishermen resisted the
legislation, insisting that fish stocks were healthy, and many
scientists agreed.7 3 Before Florida enacted its gillnet ban, the
GSMFC passed a resolution stating that Florida's "proposed net
ban referendum has not been evaluated on the basis of scientific
information through the appropriate fishery management
agencies." 74 The GSMFC was unconvinced at the time that
gillnets caused any irreparable harm to saltwater fish stocks. 75
While the Commissions are commonly perceived as
conservation vehicles, they must also promote the "better
utilization" of fisheries. In the opinion of the GSMFC, Florida
banned its commercial gillnet fishing industry in the Gulf without
a proper scientific basis. Such a decision impacts the economies of
coastal towns. Because the GSMFC lacks regulatory authority
over member states, Florida acted unilaterally without consulting
neighboring states sharing fishery resources, which may cause
70. Id. at 392-93 (Florida banned commercial gillnets in 1994).
71. Id. at 394-95.
72. See id. at 395. The gill-net example is most useful if viewed as an
indication of the lack of fishery-management uniformity resulting from a
powerless GSMFC, rather than as a debate of whether conservationist or
commercial interests should be favored in this particular fisherymanagement scheme.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 396, quoting GULF STATES MARINE FISHERIES COMMISSION,
RESOLUTION ON THE FLORIDA NET BAN REFERENDUM (1994).

75. Id. at 396-97.
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neighboring Gulf states to prematurely relax their gillnet
regulations because of the perceived conservation that Florida's
gillnet ban provides.
IV. ASMFC

PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE RULES PROVIDE MODEL

ELEMENTS AND LESSONS LEARNED FOR POTENTIAL

PSMFC

GSMFC

AND

DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE.

A. ASMFC membership and decision-making structure,rules, and
regulations
The ASMFC Compact 76 allows member states consenting to
the Compact to follow a uniform FMP for fisheries that migrate
along the coast, thus uniformly managing the fishery as a coastal
stock instead of on a state-by-state basis. 77 Congress declared that
"[tihe failure by one or more Atlantic States to fully implement a
coastal fishery management plan can affect the status of Atlantic
coastal fisheries, and can discourage other States from fully
78
implementing coastal fishery management plans."

Each ASMFC member state appoints three commissioners to
the ASMFC; the delegation must include the executive officer of
the state's fishery resource management agency, a member of the
state's legislature or his proxy, and a gubernatorial appointee with
knowledge of marine fisheries issues.7 9
These three state
delegates form the state's quorum at Commission meetings, and
decide how their member state will vote on fishery management
motions.8 0 In addition to the voting member states, the United
76. ASMFC Compact, 56 Stat. at 267.
77. ASMFC Compact, amend. I, Pub. L. No. 81-721, 64 Stat. 467 (1950)
(referring to Amendment One).
78. 16 U.S.C. § 5101(a)(5). See discussion supra Part II.
79. ASMFC Compact, 56 Stat. at 267-68 (art. III).
80. Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission Rules and Regulations
art. III § 1 (1996), available at http://www.asmfc.org/ (follow "Publications"
hyperlink; then follow "ASMFC Compact: Rules & Regulations (revised
December 2003)" hyperlink) [hereinafter ASMFC Rules and Regulations]; see
supra text accompanying note 34 (listing of ASMFC member states). When
any member states' quorum decides to make a motion to introduce or change
a particular management measure with regard to a managed fish species,
and that motion is seconded by a different state, a vote of member states is
taken to decide whether a motion will pass or fail. The vote of each member
state is determined by the position of the state's three delegates to the
Commission; whichever position two of the three state's delegates take
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States Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Marine Fisheries
Service, the Potomac River Fisheries Commission and the District
of Columbia are also voting members, and may vote on any matter
affecting their respective jurisdictions. 8 '
1. Proceduralrules for fishery-management decision-making
a. Motions and votes are requiredfor major decisions
The ASMFC Compact requires an affirmative vote of a
majority of member states on recommendations regarding a
species in which a member state has an interest.8 2 States have an
"interest" in a species if a particular species is customarily found
in the state's waters, if the species spawns in the territorial
waters of the state, or if the citizens of the state have taken five
percent or more of the total Atlantic coast catch of that species for
the five preceding years.8 3 Commissioners discuss motions for the
addition of new fishery management measures or alteration of
existing fishery management measures and work to refine the
motions' language. States then vote on the motion, each state
representing one vote, and the new or changed fishery
management measures become binding on all member states
when a majority of member states approve the motion.8 4

determine whether a member state votes for or against a particular motion.
ASMFC Rules and Regulations, supra, art. III § 1.
81. ASMFC Charter, supranote 27, § 3(a)(2)-(3).
82. ASMFC Compact, 56 Stat. at 268 (art. VI) ("No recommendation shall
be made by the Commission in regard to any species of fish except by the
affirmative vote of a majority of the compacting states which have an interest
in such species. The Commission shall define what shall be an interest.").
83. ASMFC Rules and Regulations, supra note 80, art. VI § 5(a-c) ("A
state shall be deemed to have an interest in a fishery if, according to the
latest published statistics or available records of the National Marine
Fisheries Service or equivalent state statistics, it meets any of the following
criteria: (a) such fish are found customarily in its territorial water; (b) such
fish are customarily or periodically in the territorial waters of such state for
the purpose of spawning or in transit to and from spawning grounds; or (c)
the citizens of the state are recorded as having taken 5 percent or more of the
total Atlantic coast catch of the species of fish in any of the five preceding
years.").
84. Id. at art. III § 2; ASMFC Compact 56 Stat. at 268 (art. VI).
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b. Major decisions are made availablefor public comment
The Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act
and the ASMFC Charter require that fishery-management
decisions involve adequate public disclosure and comment.8 5 The
Commission must provide the public an opportunity to review and
comment upon the problems and alternative solutions addressed
by a Public Information Document as well as drafts of
amendments to FMPs which must be made "widely available" to
the public.8 6 Because each state with an interest in a regulated
fish species votes to approve the measures contained in an FMP,
draft documents of FMPs containing several different allocation
options for the state are circulated to several public hearings
within each state. The Commission considers public comments
when it votes on the final FMP or amendment FMP document for
each species. This procedural measure allows the public in each
state to express whether they would like to be more or less
conservative while staying within the scientifically permissible
limits for fishery regulation of that species as determined by the
87
Commission.

85. 16 U.S.C. § 5104(a)(2)(B) (directing the ASMFC to establish
procedures to ensure that there is adequate opportunity for public
participation in the plan preparation process, including a minimum of four
public hearings and procedures for consideration of written comments from
the public); ASMFC Charter, supra note 27, § 1(c) ("It is the policy of the
Commission that its Interstate Fishery Management Program... provide
adequate opportunity for public participation.").
86. ASMFC Charter, supra note 27, § 6(c)(3)-(8) ("The Management
Board/ Section shall.. .ensure that the public has an opportunity to review
and comment upon the problems and alternative solutions addressed by the
Public Information Document."); Id. § 6(c)(8)(ii)("...The Commission will
make the draft FMP or amendment and the accompanying Public
Information Document widely available to the public, including fishermen,
consumers, [and] government agencies and officials.. .throughout the
geographic range of the draft FMP or amendment.").
87. See id. State constituents may be allowed to choose between
allocation options for a species. For example, the public may be left to decide
whether the state should allow individual fishermen to capture two fish at
twenty-eight inches each, one fish at thirty-four inches with a second at
twenty-four inches, only one fish at twenty-eight inches, and so on. No state
may adopt an allocation option that is less conservative than scientifically
determined to be in the best interest of that species' coastal stock. See id.
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c. Annual reviews of FMPs provides adaptive management
Plan Review Teams for each species review the species' FMP
annually and report to each species' ASMFC Management Board,
addressing the status of the fishery, the status of the FMP, and
the success of the FMP in reaching its goals.88 This annual review
provision prevents an ineffective FMP from remaining in place too
long, and allows each respective Management Board to frequently
assess whether an amendment FMP is needed to achieve fishery
management goals. Also, an emergency action provision in the
ASMFC Charter allows the Commission to address serious
unforeseeable threats to fishery resources or to the public health
without requiring strict adherence to the procedural and
89
substantive decision-making rules.
2. Substantive rules for fishery-management decision-making
a. Decisions based upon "best scientific information available"
FMPs shall be based on the "best scientific information
available." 90 Data reflecting the current state and future trends of
a fishery should be most influential in ASMFC management
decisions. This "best science" rule replaces less reliable nonscientific motivations in fishery management negotiation and thus
prevents arbitrary fishery management decision-making within
the Commission. As discussed infra,91 courts have applied a
relaxed standard when scrutinizing whether the ASMFC has used
the "best scientific information available," and will usually allow
more conservative fishery regulations than dictated by science to
92
compensate for scientific uncertainty.

88. Id. § 6(c)(2).
89. Id. § 6(c)(10). Emergency action may only be taken after a two-thirds
vote of member states, and public comment must be held immediately
following the decision to invoke emergency action. Id.
90. 16 U.S.C. § 5104(a)(2)(A); ASMFC Charter, supra note 27, § 6(a)(2).
91. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.a.i.
92. See, e.g., Fishermen's Dock Coop. v. Brown, 75 F.3d 164, 165 (4th Cir.
1996).
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i. Courts define the "best science" rule broadly
Many ASMFC rules respecting fishery management remain
untouched by courts. However, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit interpreted the "best science" rule
in Fishermen's Dock Cooperative, Inc. v. Brown.93 In Fishermen's
Dock, the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision by the United
94
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to
invalidate an ASMFC -promulgated FMP for summer flounder
(state waters) in cooperation with the Mid-Atlantic Fishery
Management Council (for federal waters). In Fishermen'sDock, a
coalition of commercial fishermen sued the Secretary of Commerce
for enforcing a summer flounder FMP which increased the yearly
coastal quota by only twenty-eight percent (28%) when scientific
estimates indicated that summer flounder stocks could tolerate as
much as a fifty-six percent (56%) increase in landings. 95 The
plaintiff fishermen argued that the more conservative FMP
violated the "best scientific information available" rule because
the record showed that flounder stocks scientifically could tolerate
96
a larger quota.
The District Court initially required the ASFMC to increase
the quota by fifty-six percent because scientific estimates
indicated that summer flounder stocks could tolerate such an
increase, disallowing the more conservative quota promulgated by
the Commission. 97 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the
District Court's narrow interpretation of the "best scientific
information available" rule was incorrect; a broader interpretation

93. Id.
94. Fishermen's Dock Coop. v. Brown, 867 F. Supp. 385 (E.D. Va. 1994),
rev'd 75 F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 1996).
95. 75 F.3d at 166.
The ASMFC and the Mid-Atlantic Fisheries
Management Council both agreed to increase the yearly coastal quota from
12.5 million pounds in 1993 only to 16 million pounds in 1994 (twenty-eight
percent increase) when scientific estimates indicated that summer flounder
stocks could tolerate quotas up to 19 million pounds (fifty-six percent
increase), based on recruitment levels in each of the previous five years. Id.
96. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.a.
Both the Magnuson Act
(management in federal EEZ) and Atlantic Coastal Cooperative Fisheries
Management Act (management in state waters) require that fisherymanagement development employ the "best scientific information available."
97. Fisherman'sDock, 75 F.3d at 169 (allowing a larger quota and more
harvestable fish for commercial fishermen).
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was necessary to allow for consideration of both the vast
uncertainty involved with fluctuations in fish populations, and the
range of reasonable and rational decisions of fishery-management
developers who employ their expertise to choose the most desired
management measures for continued population growth.98 The
Fourth Circuit reversed the decision of the District Court on the
basis of the four rational reasons for electing to implement the
more conservative commercial quota for summer flounder offered
by the ASMFC and the Council. 99
Thus, it appears unlikely that the "best science" rule will
restrict the ASMFC from promulgating allocation measures in
FMPs that are more conservative than scientific estimates indicate
are tolerable. More conservative FMPs should fail only, as the
Fourth Circuit reasoned in Fishermen's Dock, if the FMP is
unreasonably and irrationally too conservative with respect to the
scientific state of the fishery at that time. 100 The Fourth Circuit
correctly noted the uncertainty involved with fishery science; the
District Court in Fishermen'sDock seemingly ignored this concept.
Generally, more conservative management measures should
decrease chances that a stock's yearly fishing mortality rate will
exceed the stock's recruitment, and further improve the
population's opportunity to grow.
However, courts should apply the "best science" rule more
strictly to ASMFC decisions that are less conservative than
scientific estimates indicate are tolerable by fish stocks. Fisherymanagement decisions less conservative than those dictated by
98. Id. at 171-72.
99. See id. at 171. The four reasons were:
first, the truncated age structure of the summer flounder population,
which magnified the risk to target F involved in any overestimate of
the size of the recruitment class; second, the general proposition that
a lower recruitment estimate provided a higher probability of
assuring that actual F would turn out to be less than or equal to
target F; third, the recognition that certain assumptions underlying
the estimate of the flounder stock size might be overly optimistic;
and, fourth, the belief that, since target F was to decrease
significantly in 1996, it was better to deal with the current
uncertainty in recruitment estimates by erring on the conservative
side rather than risking an exacerbation of the painful quota
decrease that had to come soon in any case.
Id.
100. See id. at 171-72.
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relevant science could be immediately disastrous because of
scientific uncertainty, unlike more conservative measures. In
sum, courts should hold fishery regulations that are less
conservative than those dictated by the best scientific information
available to be per se invalid, forcing fishery-managers to use
caution in final FMP decisions.
b. Fairand equitable allocation of fishery resources
The ASMFC Charter requires that fishery resources be fairly
and equitably allocated or assigned among the states. 0 1 This
standard prohibits member states from exploiting advantageous
fishery resource circumstances, such as increased coastal species
abundances in state waters during spawning periods.
Management of coastal fisheries as a coastal resource demands
that all states receive equal access to the resource. Unequal
allocation of fishery resources among the states would, positively
or negatively, impact coastal economies in states where allocation
is expanded or restricted. Furthermore, the "fair and equitable"
rule prevents states from removing more than their determined
share of the coastal fishery resource as deemed appropriate by the
Commission, thus protecting the availability of the resource for
other states.
B. Effective compliance monitoring and federal enforcement are
essential
All ASMFC member states must implement fishery
regulations for each species in compliance with that species' FMP
as designed by the Commission. 0 2 The ASMFC must monitor
state compliance. 103 The ASMFC Management Boards 104 review a
101. ASMFC Charter, supra note 27, § 6(a)(7)(ii).
102. 16 U.S.C. § 5104(b)(1); ASMFC Charter, supra note 27, § 7(a).
103. 16 U.S.C. § 5104(c); Medeiros v. Atl. States Marine Fisheries
Comm'n, 327 F. Supp. 2d 145, 147 (D. R.I. 2004).
104. Within the ASMFC, each managed fish species is regulated by its
own, individual "Management Board" which consists only of the member
states where the particular species is known to spawn or reside. The
Management Board is responsible for all decisions regarding management
and regulation of its particular species. A species' management board meets
to review the new scientific findings and technical suggestions for future
regulations of the species. For example, the striped bass Management Board
makes motions and votes only on striped bass issues. ASMFC Charter, supra
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state's compliance (or non-compliance) report for each particular
species annually, and, if necessary, will alert the Commission's
Policy Board 0 5 of a state's non-compliance. 0 6 If the Policy Board
agrees with a Management Board that a state is not in compliance
with an FMP, the entire Commission will consider the evidence
and vote on whether to notify the Secretary of Commerce
(Secretary) of a state's non-compliance, or to allow more time for
07
non-compliant states to achieve compliance.
If the Secretary receives notification of a state's noncompliance, s/he must decide whether to impose a moratorium on
the fishery in question within that state. After the ASMFC
notification, the Secretary then decides (1) whether s/he agrees
with the Commission that a state failed to comply with the FMP
and (2) whether the particular measures of the FMP that the state
failed to implement are necessary for the conservation of the
species in question. 0 8 In the event both prongs are satisfied, the
state may defend its position to the Secretary. 0 9 If the Secretary's
opinion on non-compliance remains unchanged after the state's
defense, s/he "shall" impose a moratorium within six months after
his final decision." 0 The non-compliant state may negate an
impending or existing moratorium by satisfying the Commission
that it has achieved compliance with the relevant FMP."'
C. Appeals process for aggrieved states is ineffective unless
respected
The ASMFC recently developed a formal appeals process for
aggrieved states to address procedural or substantive aspects of
FMP decision-making. This appeals process differs from appeals
challenging ASMFC findings of non-compliance. 1 2 Instead, this
note 27, § 4
105. The ASMFC "Policy Board" is a reviewing body consisting of ASMFC
commissioners that oversees the general operations of the many different
management boards for the different species. ASMFC Charter, supranote 27,
§3.
106. ASMFC Charter, supra note 27, § 7(c).
107. Id. § 7(d)-(e).
108. 16 U.S.C. § 5106(a); Medeiros, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 147.
109. Medeiros, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 147.
110. 16 U.S.C. § 5106(c)(1).
111. Id. § 5106(c)(2).
112. ASMFC Charter, supra note 27, § 7(g) ("A State which disagrees with
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process allows states to appeal to the ASMFC Policy Board if they
113
are "aggrieved by an action of the [Species] Management Board"
as provided by the ASMFC Charter.14 This long-overdue appeals
process provides a potential remedy to those states with a viable
claim against a species' Management Board for procedural or
substantive ASMFC rules violations during FMP development.
The ASMFC approved the new appeals process guidelines in
August 2004.
To begin, aggrieved states may only appeal
management measures established through an FMP or
amendment on the following grounds: 1) decision appealed is not
consistent with the FMP; 2) decision resulted from a failure to
follow process; 3) decision resulted from insufficient, inaccurate, or
incorrect application of technical information; 4) decision resulted
from inadequate addressing of historical landings period; or if 5)
the
management
measures
resulted
in
unforeseen
consequences." 5 The aggrieved state must demonstrate that all
other options to gain relief at the management board level have
been exhausted."16 The three chairmen will only forward the
appeal to the Policy Board for comprehensive review if an initial
screen of the state's appeal results in a determination that the
disputed issues fall within one of the five previously described
categories." 7 A majority vote by the Policy Board is required to
recommend corrective action to the Management Board, which
would involve necessary substantive changes in an FMP or action
to ensure that procedural aspects were followed in FMP
development."18 As discussed infra, commissioners' respect for the
a Management Board's failure to find a State out of compliance may appeal
that finding to the ISFMP Policy Board. .. ").
113. See supra text accompanying note 104 (explaining "Management
Boards").
114. ASMFC Charter, supra note 27, § 4(h).
115.

ATLANTIC STATES MARINE FISHERIES COMMISSION, APPEALS PROCESS 1-

2 (approved by the ISFMP Policy Board, August 18, 2004) (setting forth the
substantive and procedural rules of the new appeal process).
116. Id. at 2.
117. See id. at 2-3. The "Chairmen" are the current ASMFC Chairman,
the ASMFC Vice-Chairman, and immediate past Chairman. As described,
they first review the state's appeal to verify that the issues are appealable
issues before forwarding it to the Policy Board for review. Id.
118. Id. at 3. Membership on the ISFMP Policy Board is comprised of all
member states, as represented by each state's three commissioners, a
representative from the National Marine Fisheries Service, a representative
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substantive and procedural rules of the ASMFC will determine
the effectiveness of the new appeals process. 119
D. Flaws in Commission decision-making must be addressed
The ASMFC must maintain integrity throughout fisherymanagement development because its decisions become binding
on member states and the voting procedure used to finalize FMPs
is inherently inadequate to uphold the procedural and substantive
rules described above. 120 In 2004, the State of New Jersey
challenged what it claimed to be serious procedural and
substantive violations of ASMFC rules in the decision-making
process. The circumstances of the appeal clearly demonstrate the
shortcomings in the Commission's FMP development.
1. New Jersey's 2004 Striped Bass Amendment 6 Appeal
New Jersey appealed several ASMFC Atlantic Striped Bass
Management Board (Striped Bass Board) decisions regarding
Amendment 6 to the FMP for Atlantic Striped Bass (Amendment
6) in November 2004. New Jersey challenged Board action where
2
the Board finalized FMP measures without a proper motion,' '
22
finalized FMP measures without prescribed public comment,
23
and allocated fishery resources unfairly and inequitably.
a. Circumstancesgiving rise to New Jersey's appeal
As part of the striped bass FMP, the Striped Bass Board
formally designated the Delaware Bay and Hudson River as
"producer areas" in 1995 along with the Chesapeake Bay and
Albemarle Sound because of their contributions as spawning
habitat. 124 For the next ten years, the Striped Bass Board
managed striped bass in "coastal areas" differently from striped

of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. The ISFMP Policy Board also
includes representatives from the Potomac River Fisheries Commission and
the District of Columbia, when species under those jurisdictions are
implicated. See ASMFC Charter, supra note 27, § 3(a).
119. See discussion infra Part IV.D.2.
120. See discussion infra Part IV.D.I.a.
121. See discussion supra Part IV.A.I.a.
122. See discussion supra Part IV.A.I.b.
123. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.b.
124. Striped Bass Amendment 5, supra note 47, § 3.
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bass in the four major producing areas; fishermen in "producer
areas" could take smaller, more abundant resident striped bass
125
than fishermen in "coastal areas."

During 2002, the Striped Bass Board revised striped bass
regulations and developed Amendment 6 to the Striped Bass FMP
(Amendment 6). The public commented only on a Public Hearing
Draft of Amendment 6 that included abundant language
indicating that the Delaware and Hudson estuaries would remain
"producer areas" along with the Chesapeake Bay and Albemarle
Sound under Amendment 6.126 Thus, the public never commented
on proposed measures that involved any removal of "producer
area" status.
After the public comment period ended, the Striped Bass
Board passed a vague motion in December 2002 that would govern
striped bass management for the next several years. 127 According
to the language of this motion, the recreational harvest limits on
striped bass for all member states were to remain at the ". . .level

125. "Producer areas" are designated to allow anglers near nursery
habitat to take one of the more abundant smaller (twenty inches) striped bass
because larger fish are rarely available in that area. Fishermen in "coastal
areas," areas other than "producer areas," must only take larger fish. Such
an allocation option biologically causes no harm to the coastal stock.
126. Public Hearing Draft of Amendment 6 to the Interstate Fishery
Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass §§ 1.1.1, 1.1.2.2., 1.4.1.2, 2.1.1,
3.2 (July 2002) [hereinafter Amendment 6 Public Hearing Draft]. Id. at 57.
(For example, section 3.2 included the following language: "Since the VPA
must be tuned with fishery-independent data, it is critical that all major
producer areas (Hudson River, Delaware River, Chesapeake Bay, and
Albemarle Sound/Roanoke River) are surveyed annually for spawning stock
assessment.").
127. Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission Striped Bass
Management Board Meeting Minutes, Dec. 19, 2002, at 40 [hereinafter
Minutes, Dec. 19, 2002]. The motion read: "Move that the coastal commercial
quota will be restored to the base period average, 1972 to 1979, with the
stipulation that Delaware will maintain its current commercial quota. The
coastal recreational measures will be maintained at the level authorized in
Amendment 5, two fish at 28 inches, and the current Chesapeake Bay
mortality rate will not exceed F equals 0.27." Id. The motion was approved
9-4, with New Jersey opposing. Id. at 57. (Even the Striped Bass Board
Chairman failed to initially understand the motion, then offered his own
clarification: "[I] think that previous motion, at least the way it stands right
now, that was approved, it presumes that we're at - I assume it presumes
that we're at the 20/28 [inch] scenario, which we have had under Amendment
5.... ").
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authorized in Amendment 5.. .. " New Jersey interpreted this
language to indicate that Delaware Bay and Hudson River
regulations would not change from Amendment 5 to Amendment
6; the State understood that Delaware Bay and the Hudson River
would maintain "producer" status.
Even the ASMFC
acknowledged that the motion conveyed a perception that "the
[Striped Bass Management] Board was implementing status quo,"
and that perception "came from the Advisory Panel's
recommendation, and the majority of public comments, favoring
status quo for allocation to the recreational fishery."128

These

internal observations by the ASMFC validate New Jersey's
assessment of the motion.
However, after the Striped Bass Board passed the December
2002 motion, a single ASMFC commissioner, unhappy with the
"producer area" versus "coastal area" method of striped bass
management for Delaware Bay and Hudson River, personally
instructed the striped bass Plan Development Team 129 to
eliminate those two estuaries from "producer" status, impacting
Delaware Bay and Hudson River allocation.1 30 Apparently, the
Board used this vague language to exercise significant latitude in
drastically changing the coastal management structure under
Amendment 6 without confronting the necessities of a more
1
specific motion. 3
128. Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission Interstate Fisheries
Management Program Policy Board: Atlantic Striped Bass: Clarification on
Changes to the Interstate Fishery Management Program from Amendment 5
to Amendment 6, at 1 (Aug. 27, 2003) (on file with the Author and with the
ASMFC) [hereinafter ISFMP Policy Board Clarification Document].
129. The Plan Development Team is a staff that is responsible for creating
the actual Amendment documents.
130. Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission Striped Bass
Management Board Meeting Minutes, Feb. 24, 2003, at 18 [hereinafter
Minutes, Feb. 24, 2003] (Referring to the ongoing dispute about the "producer
area" language, an ASMFC staff member stated: "[S]taff was given explicit
direction.. .that producer areas were to be eliminated from the document.
We will no longer be using the term 'producer area.'"); Minutes, Dec. 19, 2002,
supra note 127, at 59 (The actual instruction to stricken the terms "producer
area" from the FMP document was given by one of New York's three
commissioners to the ASMFC: "I went so far, in fact. .. as to tell my staff
member on the [Plan Development Team]...that when the final version of
the text of Amendment 6 came to me.. .if I found the words 'producer area' in
it anywhere, there was going to be hell to pay because it doesn't exist and
we've got to stop using those terms.").
131. ISFMP Policy Board Clarification Document, supra note 128, at 1.
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New Jersey's Commissioners sought clarification and reintroduction of the "producer area" issue at subsequent meetings
for more complete deliberation, but the Striped Bass Board
repeatedly ignored New Jersey's concerns. 132 The removal of
"producer status" from the final Amendment 6 document was
significant because the resulting allocation measures required
fishermen in previous "producer area" New Jersey waters to
adhere to the coastal allocation measures, disallowing fishermen
to take smaller fish and forcing them to harvest only larger fish.
However, the Striped Bass Board allowed Chesapeake Bay and
Albemarle Sound to maintain an "exemption" to the coastal
requirement without explanation; thus, fishermen in those areas
could continue to harvest smaller fish. Allocation measures are
critical issues in FMP development, and the discrete removal of
"producer status" from the FMP impacts allocation among states;
allocation decisions should never occur without strict adherence to
governing rules and procedures.
The Striped Bass Board approved Amendment 6 in February
2003, removing the Delaware Bay and Hudson River from
"producer area" status for the first time in eight years. 133 It
contained provisions exempting the Chesapeake Bay and
Albemarle Sound from the coastal requirements, and even relaxed
requirements on Delaware Bay commercial fishermen (as opposed
to recreational fishermen) without a motion, without public
comment, and, New Jersey claimed, in violation of the "fair and
equitable" rule. 3 4 The next three subsections will explore these
132. Minutes, Feb. 24, 2003, supra note 130, at 9-13. New Jersey's
Commissioners to the ASMFC argued that the December 2002 motion was
inconsistent with the language of the actual Amendment 6 document and
without any proper justification; the Commissioners expressed displeasure
that these changes were never made available for public comment in New
Jersey, and that these changes were in no way the intent or within the
possibilities contemplated by New Jersey on these issues. Id. at 12-13. New
York's Commissioner defended the action of removing "producer area"
language from the Amendment 6 document. Id. at 19. Finally, the Chairman
ended the debate without resolution by simply determining New Jersey's
clarification motions to be "out of order." Id. at 17.
133. See Striped Bass Amendment 6, supra note 49.
134. See generally, Minutes, Dec. 19, 2002, supra note 127 (these crucial
pre-Amendment 6 meeting minutes indicate no motion or discussion of any
motion proposing to remove "producer area" status, exempt the Chesapeake
Bay or Albemarle Sound, or to relax harvest requirements for Delaware Bay
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violations of ASMFC rules by the Striped Bass Board during
Amendment 6 development.
b. Changes in "producer"status violated proceduralrequirement of
a motion and vote
The ASMFC's Striped Bass Board failed to follow Commission
procedure when it approved the Amendment 6 FMP, eliminating
the "producer area" versus "coastal area" method of striped bass
management and awarding unexplained exemptions allowing
Chesapeake Bay and Albemarle Sound fishermen to harvest
smaller striped bass without a proper motion and vote. Article VI
of the ASMFC Compact always requires an affirmative vote of a
majority of compacting states on issues involving a
recommendation regarding a species in which a compacting state
has an "interest."135 New Jersey clearly has an "interest" in
striped bass: striped bass are customarily found in New Jersey
waters, striped bass spawn in New Jersey waters, and New Jersey
citizens have taken more than five percent of the coastal catch of
striped bass annually. 136 Therefore, Article VI required a motion
and vote on the "producer area" and exemption issues involving
changes to striped bass regulations in New Jersey waters.
Here, the Striped Bass Board never made a motion nor took a
vote on these critical allocation issues impacting fishermen in New
Jersey waters in Delaware Bay and Hudson River. The Striped
Bass Board never passed a motion explicitly removing "producer
area" status from Delaware Bay and Hudson River. Similarly, the
Striped Bass Board never passed a motion exempting the
Chesapeake Bay and Albemarle Sound estuaries from the more
stringent, conservative coastal recreational requirement, while
imposing the more stringent coastal requirement in the two
northernmost producing estuaries, Delaware Bay and Hudson
River.

commercial fishermen).
135. ASMFC Compact 56 Stat. at 268 (art. VI); see supra text
accompanying note 83; see also discussion supra Part IV.A. L.a.
136. ASMFC Rules and Regulations, supra note 80, art. VI § 5(a-c); see
supra text accompanying note 83. New Jersey undoubtedly has an "interest"
in striped bass under these rules.
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The ASMFC motion and vote requirement for major fishery
management decisions should ensure each state an opportunity to
present its viewpoint on the proposed management measure on
the record to the other member states. A complete public record of
the decision-making process preserves the integrity and
legitimacy of the resulting regulations because the impacted
citizens of member states can review their state's stance on an
issue, and the underlying basis for final fishery-management
regulations approved by a formal vote of member states. This, in
turn, preserves accountability within the Commission; states
against which promulgated regulations are binding should have a
say in the decision. Here, New Jersey fishermen lost their
opportunity to keep smaller, more abundant fish in nursery
habitats, and the Striped Bass Board deprived the State of the
opportunity to debate the new regulation on the record. The
Striped Bass Board's neglect of the motion and vote rule
prevented New Jersey's commissioners from representing the
State's position on the issues, violating the ASMFC Compact. The
ineffectiveness of the motion and vote rule will continue if not
enforced within the ASMFC.
c. Changes in "producer"status violatedproceduralrequirement of
public comment
The ASMFC's Striped Bass Board failed to follow Commission
procedure when it approved the Amendment 6 FMP, eliminating
the "producer area" versus "coastal area" method of striped bass
management and awarding unexplained exemptions allowing
Chesapeake Bay and Albemarle Sound fishermen to harvest
smaller striped bass without allowing for public comment on the
issues. The ASMFC Charter requires adequate public disclosure
and public comment on FMP amendments; 137 the public must have
an opportunity to review and comment upon the problems and
alternative solutions addressed in the draft amendment
8
document. 13
137. ASMFC Charter, supra note 27, § 1(c); see discussion supra Part
IV.A.1.b.
138. ASMFC Charter, supra note 27, § 6(c)(3-8); see id. § 6(c)(8)(ii) ("[Tihe
Commission will make the draft FMP or amendment and the accompanying
Public Information Document widely available to the public, including
fishermen, consumers, government agencies and officials.. .throughout the
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The Striped Bass Board never circulated an Amendment 6
public comment document mentioning any FMP option involving
the removal of "producer area" status from any estuary, nor any
option that would manage the Chesapeake Bay and Albemarle
Sound producing areas completely differently from the similar
Delaware Bay and Hudson River producing areas. 139
In
contradistinction, the public comment document emphasized that
"producer area" designations would be retained under Amendment
6.140 Thus, elimination of "producer area" status from established
striped bass spawning habitat and the subsequent exemption
granted for Chesapeake Bay and Albemarle Sound relaxing
striped bass harvest limits in those waters occurred without
public disclosure or comment. 141
Similar to the motion and vote rule discussed supra, the
public disclosure and comment rule preserves accountability in
Commission decision-making because it helps expose the proposed
FMP measures to scrutiny before they become binding. Without
public disclosure, commissioners' decisions escape the important
check of public scrutiny where minimal other checking forces
exist. The Striped Bass Board's failure to make these issues
available for proper public comment thus removed an important
check on the ASMFC decision-making process.

geographic range of the draft FMP or amendment.").
139. See Amendment 6 Public Hearing Draft, supra note 126, at 32-39.
None of the listed FMP options in the draft document involved these changes.

Id.

Instead, the 2002 draft document involved allocation options that

included different size and bag limits for producer versus coastal areas, as
well as options that would create uniform regulations for producer and
coastal areas. Id.
140. Id. §§ 3.2, 4.0, at 23. The public comment draft document listed the
Chesapeake Bay, Delaware Bay, and Hudson River as "major producer areas"
in section 3.2 and throughout section 4.0. Id. "Producer area" language also
exists in the public comment draft in places where it was omitted in the final
version of Amendment 6. Language such as "Jurisdictions bordering
producer areas... shall be responsible for conducting... stock assessment
surveys...," and "producer area" language throughout the options for
allocation changes suggested at least that, even if regulations in "producer

areas" changed, that the "producer area" designations would remain as they
had from Amendment 4 to Amendment 5. See id. §§ 3.2, 4.0, at 32-39.
141. See generally id. (never mentioning these allocation or management
options throughout the document).
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d. Exemptions and DelawareBay commercial regulationsviolated
the substantive "fairand equitable"rule
The ASMFC's Striped Bass Board, without explanation,
failed to adhere to the substantive requirement that fishery
resources be fairly and equitably allocated or assigned among the
states when it exempted (and thus reduced minimum size limits
in) the Chesapeake and Albemarle Sound without exempting
similar estuaries in the Delaware Bay and Hudson River. 142 The
Commission had previously determined that all four estuaries
made significant contributions to the coastal stock as "producer
areas." 143

However, under Amendment 6, only fishermen in

Chesapeake and Albemarle waters may harvest smaller, more
abundant fish in those nursery areas, while fishermen in similar
Delaware Bay and Hudson River may not. The Striped Bass
Board must remedy this violation of the "fair and equitable
allocation" rule.
The Striped Bass Board also violated the "fair and equitable
allocation" rule by allowing Delaware Bay commercial fishermen
to harvest twenty inch striped bass in Delaware Bay while
limiting recreationalfishermen in the same waters to a regulation
144
equivalency of two-fish per individual at twenty-eight inches.
This exemption only favored Delaware because New Jersey
disallows any commercial harvest of striped bass. Thus, Delaware
received the unfair benefit of smaller, more abundant fish, while
recreational fishermen, mainly from New Jersey, were restricted
to harvest of only larger fish. The "fair and equitable allocation"
rule, if respected, should protect member states from the political
influences that produce this type of unfair allocation.
2. Suggestions for correctingflaws in ASMFC decision making
The ASMFC Policy Board disagreed with New Jersey's
arguments on all issues described above, and denied all requests
142. ASMFC Charter, supra note 27, § 6(a)(7)(ii).
143. Striped Bass Amendment 5, supra note 47, § 3.
144. Minutes, Feb. 24, 2003, supra note 130, at 10-15. The Delaware Bay
commercial exemption for fish caught as bycatch in shad-gillnets was granted
because a Delaware commissioner believed that the consequence of the
change in regulations to fish larger than 20 inches "...would be a drastic
change in Delaware's commercial fishery." Id. at 8-9. The Striped Bass
Board was sympathetic, and allowed the exemption. Id. at 10-15.
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for relief.145 The new ASMFC appeals process will fail to increase
the procedural and substantive soundness of management board
decision-making and will fail to decrease political influence within
Commission processes if the Commission fails to take appeals
seriously. The appeals process should help maintain practical and
pragmatic fishery management decision-making, minimizing the
non-science based influences on commissioners.
Two significant flaws will prevent an effective appeals
process. First, many ASMFC commissioners are non-lawyers, and
thus do not exercise legal judgment in an adjudicatory role, nor
are they always cognizant of the implications of their decisions as
precedent for the future of successful fisheries regulation. Second,
Policy Board members are the same people who sit on a species'
Management Board and helped architect the very regulatory
measures appealed by the aggrieved state. As a result, bias and
prejudice likely influence the fate of an appeal.
The ASMFC can address these flaws by adding an arbitration
group to Commission staff. Arbitrators would be lawyers familiar
with fisheries law and management, and would be called upon by
the Commission when necessary to adjudicate appeals. Member
states would consent to defer to the judgment of the arbitration
group in appeal situations. The aggrieved state and the opposing
species Management Board would perform their own fact finding
and each present the arbitrators with a comprehensive appeal
document and supporting materials. The arbitrators would then
apply governing Commission rules from the ASMFC Compact,
Rules and Regulations, or Charter to the facts, and decide the
issues.
Without such neutral adjudication, and without
enforceable substantive and procedural rules, the member states
cannot expect the decision-making process to be devoid of
pressures not directly related to achieving successful fishery
conservation.
These measures will benefit the FMP development process.
First, enhanced rule clarity will result, enabling commissioners
deciding on FMPs at the species management board level to vote
on motions in compliance with ASMFC guidelines. Second, an
effective appeals process will keep contentious fishery
145. Interstate Fisheries Management Program Meeting Summary, Nov.
11, 2004, on file with the ASMFC, and with the Author.
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management issues, especially those regarding allocation, out of
courts and in the hands of fishery managers where they belong.
Fishery managers frequently struggle with litigation that delays
the fishery management process, and an effective appeals process
within the ASMFC would eliminate much of the need for parties
to litigate management issues.
V. CONGRESS SHOULD GRANT SIMILAR REGULATORY AUTHORITY TO

GSMFC AND PSMFC
A. Evidence demonstrates the potential Commission effectiveness
with regulatoryauthority
The monumental restoration of the coastal striped bass
population, as well as successful summer flounder fishery
management, both demonstrate the ASMFC's effectiveness with
regulatory authority. The ASMFC also actively manages several
other coastal species, including recent FMP development for the
146
unglamorous spiny dogfish.
In contrast, the powerless GSMFC failed to compel uniformity
over its member states regarding coastal commercial gillnet
regulations. This management scheme, unlike that involved with
the ASMFC, will lead to inconsistent management of critical Gulf
coastal fisheries. Also, the PSMFC fails to properly manage spiny
dogfish in the Pacific because, even if the PSMFC developed a
spiny dogfish FMP, it would not be binding on the Pacific States.
Therefore, Congress should grant similar regulatory authority
to the Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission and the Pacific
States Marine Fisheries Commission. 147 The resulting uniformity
in coastal fishery management regulations across the member
states of each commission will effectively conserve and promote
the utilization of the many migratory species residing in state
waters along the coast. The GSMFC and PSMFC should both
follow the general model created by the ASMFC for fisherymanagement development; both the GSMFC and PSMFC
Compacts already mirror that of the ASMFC. However, the
recently implemented ASMFC appeals process should be refined
146.
147.
241.

See supra text accompanying note 39.
Ocean Commission Report, supra note 2, Recommendation 19-10 at
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before adopted by GSMFC and PSMFC; 148 a meaningful appeals
process will help to maintain the fishery management decisionmaking focus on sound science, preventing other influences from
infiltrating the decision-making process and hindering effective
fishery management along the coasts.
B. Commission authority is insulatedfrom state challenges that
the FMP is "unfavorable"
Whereas courts should be receptive to state claims alleging
substantive and procedural violations of decision-making rules by
Commission, 149 courts should not be receptive to states claiming
only that they "disfavor" a Commission-promulgated FMP. For
example, in Connecticut v. Daley, 50 Connecticut sued the
Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) challenging the final decisions
of the ASMFC and the Mid-Atlantic Fisheries Management
Council not to implement a coastal quota system in Amendment
10 of the summer flounder FMP in 1997. Connecticut claimed
that the resulting Amendment severely restricted summer
flounder landings in Connecticut.1 51 The court noted that the
decisions of the Secretary of Commerce to implement FMPs
designed by the Regional Councils and the ASMFC should receive
appropriate deference because Congress charges these entities
with the responsibility of employing their expertise to make
policy judgments and establish appropriate management
measures based on evaluations of relevant scientific evidence. 5 2
The court then proceeded to examine whether the actions of the
Secretary in enforcing the FMP were arbitrary and capricious. 5 3
See discussion supra Parts IV.C., IV.D.2.
149. New Jersey's 2004 appeal presents examples of the types of
148.

substantive and procedural issues that, if unresolved, courts should be
receptive to adjudicating. See discussion supra Part IV.D. 1
150. 53 F. Supp. 2d 147, 159 (D. Conn. 1999).
151. Id. at 153, 159.
152. See id. at 157-58. The Secretary has broad discretion when using his
expertise to promulgate regulations implementing FMPs, and courts
generally may only consider "whether this discretion was exercised rationally
and consistently with the standards set by Congress." Id. at 157 (quoting
Louisiana v. Baldridge, 538 F. Supp. 625, 628 (E.D. La. 1982)).
153. Daley, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 158 (seeking to determine whether the
administrative record was so devoid of justification for these FMP measures
that that the Secretary's decision to implement them was "necessarily
arbitrary and capricious").
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While the Magnuson Act charges the Regional Councils with
making policy judgments on fishery management in the EEZ, the
Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act similarly
charges the ASMFC with making policy judgments on fishery
management in state waters to be implemented by the states and
enforced by the Secretary. In sum, ASMFC decisions, through the
Secretary, should receive deference by courts similar to that
applied to decisions of the Regional Councils created under the
Magnuson Act. In Daley, the court correctly deferred to the
decisions of both the ASMFC and the Mid-Atlantic Fisheries
Management Council to reject Connecticut's proposed quota for
summer flounder management, and determined that the
Secretary's decision to enforce these FMPs was not arbitrary or
capricious.154

C. Lack of individual "standing"should further insulate
Commission authority
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode
Island in Medeiros v. Atlantic States Marine Fisheries
Commission 55 recognized but was not required to decide the issue
of whether the Tenth Amendment could invalidate the ASMFC's
coastal fishery-management scheme. In Medeiros, a plaintiff
otter-trawl fisherman from Rhode Island challenged ASMFC
lobster regulations limiting lobsters caught by non-trap
methods.1 56 Amendment Three to the American Lobster FMP
contained more relaxed regulations for fishermen using traps to
catch lobsters and more stringent regulations for fishermen using
157
non-trap methods, such as the plaintiffs otter-trawl method.
The Commission promulgated more stringent lobster regulations
154. Id. at 174 (the Secretary's decision was adequately supported by the
record).
155. 327 F. Supp. 2d 145 (D. R.I. 2004).
156. Id. at 148.
157. Id. at 147-48. In response to an over-fished lobster population,
Amendment 3 restricted the trap-method of lobster fishing by increasing the
minimum size limit for lobsters, reduced the number of traps fished per
vessel, reduced maximum trap volume, and increased the size of escape
vents. Id. at 150. However, Amendment 3 also limited non-trap fishermen to
no more than 100 lobsters per day, and this rule became applicable coast
wide once the ASMFC motioned for and voted on this regulation. Id. at 14748; see also discussion supraPart IV.A.I.a.
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for "non-trap" fishermen to limit fishing effort and protect the
fishery from efforts of the non-trap sector where non-trap
fishermen normally target other fish species. 158 Rhode Island
voted in favor of the FMP and adopted the new regulations in
2001.159

Plaintiff alleged that Amendment Three violated the Tenth
Amendment because Congress "impermissibly" required the state
to impose "federal regulations" within state waters. 160 With
regard to the Tenth Amendment claim, the court found the
Supreme Court's holding in Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v.
Tennessee Valley Auth. 161 controlling, where the Supreme Court
held that private parties lacked standing to raise a Tenth
Amendment claim without accompanying representation from the
163
state.1 62 Thus, the plaintiff s claim in Medeiros similarly failed.
However, individual challenges of ASMFC regulations are
unique because member states have an opportunity to vote in
favor of or against proposed FMPs, and FMPs become binding
even over states that actually voted against a particular FMP if a
majority of member states approve the FMP.164 Previously, the
Supreme Court declined to address the issue of whether a citizen
had standing to challenge a federal measure imposed on the state
after the state first approved the federal measure, and circuit
courts are split on the issue. 165 Circuit disagreement on whether
standing exists when a state voted in favor of a federally-imposed
regulation should signal even sharper disagreement on whether
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Medeiros, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 150.
Id. at 147-48.
Id.
306 U.S. 118 (1939).
Medeiros, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 148.
Id. at 154.

164. See discussion supra Parts IV.A.1.a., IV.A.1.b. States opposing an
FMP are still required to implement the plan in their state if a majority of
the voting states approve the FMP.
165. Medeiros, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 153 ("Recently, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari with regard to, but ultimately declined to address the
question of whether private plaintiffs have standing to assert states' rights
under the Tenth Amendment where the states' legislative and executive
branches expressly approve and accept the benefits and terms of the federal
statute in question." "The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has not
addressed whether private litigants may pursue Tenth Amendment claims.
Other circuit courts which have considered the issue are in disagreement."

(citation omitted)).

2005]

SLIPPERY FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

standing exists when a private citizen challenges a Commission
FMP imposed on a member state that voted against the FMP. A
decision on this issue will undoubtedly impact the scope of
Commissions' regulatory authority.
Currently, the Tenth Circuit as well as United States District
Courts in the Districts of Vermont, Rhode Island, and Louisiana
all follow the Supreme Court's directive in Tennessee Electric that
individual claimants lack standing to challenge a federal
regulation under the Tenth Amendment. 166 These courts correctly
preserve such challenges for the states because the political
processes of the respective states should determine whether or not
to challenge a federal regulation under the Tenth Amendment.
While other courts choose to find private party litigant standing
under similar circumstances, 167 they base their holdings on faulty
168
reasoning from prior Supreme Court cases taken out of context.
Only the states themselves possess the requisite standing to
raise a Tenth Amendment challenge against a federal regulatory
scheme. However, states are not likely to challenge ASMFC
regulatory authority under the Tenth Amendment because,
according to the ASMFC Compact and Atlantic Coastal Fisheries
Cooperative Management Act, states may still completely
withdraw their consent to the ASMFC Compact if states fail to
169
satisfactorily rectify their grievances against the Commission.
166. See United States v. Parker, 362 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004);
Mountain States Legal Found. v. Costle 630 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1980); Vt.
Assembly of Home Health Agencies v. Shalala, 18 F. Supp. 2d 355 (D. Vt.
1998); Gaubert v. Denton, 1999 WL 350103 (E.D. La. 1999), affd, 210 F.3d
368 (5th Cir. 2000).
167. See Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 700 (7th Cir.
1999); Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 349 F. Supp. 2d 566 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
(holding that private party litigants only need to comply with the normal
rules of standing, and are not precluded from doing so in the absence of the
state or its officers).
168. For a much more elaborate discussion of these unique standing issues
under ASMFC regulatory authority, see Joseph Farside, Fishery Resources
Belong to Everyone: Why Courts Should Deny Standing to Private Party
Claims that Coastal Fishery Regulations Violate the Tenth Amendment (2005)
(unpublished paper on file with author).
169. Prior to deciding to withdraw from the Commission, states may
utilize a new, internal ASMFC appeals process for aggrieved states, or states
may attempt to sue the ASMFC under typical APA - type claims challenging
possible abuses of discretion by the Commission. See discussion supra Parts
IV.C, IV.D.
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Private party actions brought solely under the Tenth Amendment
against unsatisfactory fishery management decisions promulgated
by the ASMFC lack standing because private party options to
completely invalidate ASMFC regulatory authority should be
limited to utilization of the state's political process to persuade
state officials to seek redress against ASMFC action unfavorable
to the state's citizenry. 170 Fishery resources are managed by the
states for the good of the general constituency, not for the benefit
of individuals. This lack of private-party litigant standing to
challenge the Commission's regulatory authority under the Tenth
Amendment should help insulate the regulatory structure from
litigation and other disruption from aggrieved individuals as
fishery management decisions are developed for the future of the
nation's coastal fisheries.
VI. CONCLUSION

While the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission
successfully manages fish species, commissioners must adhere
more strictly to commission decision-making rules and regulations
to prevent politics from causing fishery-management judgments to
deviate from the solid foundation of sound science. Without a
within
each
Commission,
appeals
process
respected
commissioners' decisions and motivations regarding coast-wide
However, the
fishery management may go unchecked.
demonstrated success of the ASMFC with regulatory authority,
and the necessity of a coast-wide fishery management program on

170. Support for this proposition exists in a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
case where the court held that plaintiffs' Tenth Amendment claim failed
because the certification regulations contemplated voluntary participation on
the part of state and local officials, and the certification regulations did not
command the states' officers to administer or enforce a federal regulatory
program. Lomont v. O'Neill, 285 F.3d 9, 13-15 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (the court
decided against the private party plaintiffs on the merits, but without
reaching the issue of private party litigant standing). Other support was
derived from a Tenth Circuit case that found no Tenth Amendment violation
of a federal regulation where the states were directed to negotiate in good
faith with Indian tribes to form an interstate compact, but were not required
to form an enforceable compact. Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422,
1432-34 (10th Cir. 1994).
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both the Gulf Coast and Pacific Coast should compel Congress to
grant similar regulatory authority to the Gulf Coast and Pacific
Coast Marine Fisheries Commissions.
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